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PUBLIC LAW
It is well settled that the "equal protection" clause of the
United States Constitution only relates to equality between per-
sons. "In the absence of restrictions contained in state con-
stitutions, the legislature may determine within broad limits
whether particular laws shall extend to the whole state or be
limited in their operation to particular portions of the state. All
that the Federal Constitution requires is that they shall be
general in their application within the territory in which they
operate."' 19 A relevant limitation in the Louisiana Constitution
prohibits local or special laws "concerning any civil or criminal
actions. '20 This provision has been construed as meaning "merely
that the Legislature shall not pass a local or special law affecting
any particular lawsuit or regulating the trial of lawsuits, civil
or criminal, in any particular locality."'21
Turning more specifically to the problem at hand, Justice
Sanders added: "The rich diversities in the land, people, and
culture of Louisiana are matters of common knowledge. They
have been celebrated in song and story. Many of these are deeply
rooted in history. The rural-urban diversity is but one of sev-
eral that affect trespass laws. The variegated patterns of
topography and land-use militate against state-wide uniformity
in trespass legislation. '22 In further support of the decision,
upholding the statute, the court stressed the fact that there had
been "no showing that the relevant conditions and needs in Jef-
ferson Davis Parish are the same as those of other parishes,"
and stated, "The Court cannot assume the absence of differences
when there is no proof."
DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY
Hector Currie*
The past term produced, as usual, instances of lenders who
asserted that their claims were not affected by a debtor's dis-
charge in bankruptcy, by reason of section 17a(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act which provides in part:
19. 16 Am. JUR.2d 894.
20. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
21. State v. McCue, 141 La. 417, 421, 75 So. 100, 101 (1917).
22. 247 La. 631, 637, 173 So. 2d 192, 195 (1965).
23. Ibid.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts .... except such as . .. (2) are lia-
bilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses
or false representations, or for obtaining money or property
on credit, or obtaining the extension or renewal of credit in
reliance upon a materially false statement in writing re-
specting his financial condition made or published or caused
to be made or published in any manner whatsoever with in-
tent to deceive ....
To bring his debt within this language, a plaintiff must
show: "(1) That defendant made false representations; (2) that
these representations were made with the intention of defraud-
ing the plaintiff, and (3) that the plaintiff relied upon and was
misled by the false pretenses or representations. ' 2
In Max Barnett Furniture Co., Inc. v. Romano,8 defendant
bought goods on credit and gave plaintiff a financial statement
that disclosed total indebtedness of $1580; later defendant be-
came bankrupt and scheduled liabilities amounting to almost
$15,000. Plaintiff, however, neglected to show when the sched-
uled liabilities were incurred, and thus failed in its burden of
proving that the financial statement was false.
Blue Bonnet Creamery, Inc. v. Gulf Milk Ass'n, Inc.4 was a
garnishment proceeding where the debter pleaded a discharge
in bankruptcy and plaintiff claimed that the debtor had de-
frauded it by giving worthless checks. It was proved, however,
that plaintiff's manager, who was closely familiar with the
debtor's financial condition, had insisted that the checks be is-
sued though warned by the debtor that some of them would
probably be dishonored. There was no intent to defraud, and
any possible presumption' of intent to defraud was rebutted
by the evidence.
In Friendly Fin. Discount Corp. v. Hayden,6 defendants ap-
plied for a loan with which to pay two existing debts to plain-
1. 11 U.S.C. §35a(2) (1964).
2. DeLatour v. Lala, 15 La. App. 276, 278, 131 So. 211, 212 (Orl. Cir.
1930).
3. 170 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
4. 172 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965). For a reference to the liti-
gation at an earlier stage, see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1962-1963 Term - Discharge in Bankruptcy, 24 LA. L. REv. 278, 280 (1964).
5. See LA. R.S. 14:71 (1950).
6. 171 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
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tiff. The "application and financial statement" signed by de-
fendants was filled in by plaintiff's agent and showed only the
two debts; spaces for salary and for other income were left
blank. The court held that this paper was not a "statement in
writing respecting.. . financial condition" within section 17a (2),
and that in any event reliance on it by plaintiff had not been
proved. In General Fin. Loan Co. v. Allen,7 however, where a
financial statement signed by defendant and his wife omitted
certain debts and contained the statement in the wife's hand-
writing: "We have no other debts," the money-lender was al-
lowed to recover.
Section 17a (2) also provides:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts .... except such as ... (2) are lia-
bilities . . . for willful and malicious injuries to the person
or property of another .... "I'
In Heyerdale v. Haneman9 plaintiff had contracted with de-
fendant for repairs to real estate that plaintiff owned, all mate-
rial and labor to be furnished by defendant. Before the work
was completed, plaintiff paid the contract price, but defendant
failed to pay the subcontractors and materialmen, who threat-
ened to file liens against the property. Plaintiff then paid nearly
$3,000 to the materialmen and subcontractors and got judgment
against defendant for this sum. The judgment was held not
to be affected by the subsequent bankruptcy of defendant whose
misapplication of funds was a misdemeanor' ° and came within
the class of "willful and malicious injuries to the person or
property of another."
Section 17a (3) provides:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts .... except such as . . . (3) have
not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance,
with the name of the creditor if known to the bankrupt, un-
less such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy . . .,,
7. 165 So. 2d 20 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 35a(2) (1964).
9. 170 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
10. LA. R.S. 14:202 (1950).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 35a(3) (1964).
1966]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Lashover v. Audler 12 raised the question whether plaintiff
had actual knowledge of the proceedings; his claim had not
been scheduled in defendant's bankruptcy and consequently no
notice' 8 had been received. Defendant testified that in an acci-
dental meeting with plaintiff he "mentioned" that he had "filed
bankruptcy," but plaintiff denied that such a conversation had
taken place. The court considered that if the conversation took
place it imparted no more than knowledge of the bare fact of
bankruptcy. "'Actual knowledge of the proceedings in bank-
ruptcy' in our opinion consists of more than the knowledge which
might result from a casual reference to a bankruptcy in an off-
hand manner during a conversation attendant upon a chance
meeting. It means knowledge of facts at least sufficient to ap-
prise the creditor that a proceeding is actually commenced and
where that proceeding is pending. '14 These statements are con-
sistent with a suggestion in Robinson v. Henderson'5 that actual
knowledge must be "generally equivalent to . . . legal notice,"
but they seem somewhat generous to the creditor.' 6
Marks v. Demarest17 and Huff v. Justice' held that a judicial
mortgage subsists on property owned by a bankrupt at the time
of his discharge but will not affect property he may later ac-
quire; these cases however established nothing new.' 9
12. 171 So. 2d 834 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
13. "The 'notice' contemplated by the statute is the formal written or printed
notice sent to the creditor 'by the Bankruptcy Court." Id. at 835.
14. Id. at 836.
15. 162 So. 2d 1.1.6 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
16. The problem is discussed, I COLLIE, BANKRUPTCY § 17.23 (14th ed.
1904); 8 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3357 (6th ed. 1955).
17. 174 So.2d 160 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
18. 174 So. 2d 164 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
19. See Comment, 34 TUL. L. 1Ev. 768, 776 (1960) ; Schexnailder v. Fonte-
not, 147 La. 467, 477, 85 So. 207, 211 (1920).
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